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Abstract
The paper has two main objectives: to examine the challenges arising from the use of carebots as well as to discuss how
the design of carebots can deal with these challenges. First, it notes that the use of carebots to take care of the physical and
mental health of the elderly, children and the disabled as well as to serve as assistive tools and social companions encounter
a few main challenges. They relate to the extent of the care robots’ ability to care for humans, potential deception by robot
morphology and communications, (over)reliance on or attachment to robots, and the risks of carebot use without informed
consent and potential infringements of privacy. Secondly, these challenges impinge upon issues of ethics and trust which are
somewhat overlapping in terms of concept and practice. The existing ethical guidelines, standards and regulations are general
in nature and lack a central ethical framework and concrete principles applicable to the care contexts. Hence, to deal with these
important challenges, it is proposed in the third part of the paper that carebots be designed by taking account of Ethics of Care
as the central ethical framework. It argues that the Ethics of Care offer the following advantages: (a) it provides sufficiently
concrete principles and embodies values that are sensitive and applicable to the design of carebots and the contexts of caring
practices; (b) it coheres with the tenets of Principlism and select ethical theories (utilitarianism, deontology and virtue ethics);
and (c) it is closely associated with the preservation and maintenance of trust.
Keywords Care robots · Trust · Ethics · Design · Ethics of care · Artificial intelligence
1 Introduction
Care robots are utilised in hospitals and homes to provide
care and support for vulnerable persons such as the elderly,
children and those suffering from physical and mental dis-
abilities. They monitor the health conditions of patients, give
medication, manually lift and aid the movements of disabled
patients, and provide social companionship.
There are tangible advantages in using carebots to relieve
human caregivers (whether healthcare professionals, social
workers in nursing homes or family members and loved ones)
from the significant assistive manual work and medication
reminders to patients and care recipients. Care-O-bot—a
home companion for the elderly—open doors and fetch
household items, remind the elderly of his or her daily rou-
tine and seek help in the event of a fall or accident.1 Robear
1 Sorell and Draper [67].
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acts as a nursing care robot to lift patients from the bed to
a wheelchair. The US-based robotics corporation, Acrotek,
advertise a robot for sale in an aged-care role, claiming on its
website that the Actron MentorBotTM will keep track of the
elderly persons or remind them to take pills. It is touted to
have the ability to call the authorities and report a problem or
make a call to loved ones when the patient has gone astray.
Apart from the obvious benefits in relieving the human
caregivers of the manual work and routine administration
of medication, the carebots can serve as social compan-
ions. Sony’s AIBO robotic dog and NeCoRo (OMRON), a
robotic cat covered in synthetic fur, come to mind. PARO—an
interactive robotic seal developed by AIST in Japan to com-
fort dementia sufferers—makes high-pitched sounds, and
responds to touch by moving its head and tail. It has been
reported in studies that patients may prefer interacting with
robots than human companions.2 In addition, robots can
help in facilitating therapeutic exercises and rehabilitation for
patients suffering from both physical and mental disabilities.
Since 1998, project Aurora (AUtonomous RObotic platform
as a Remedial tool for children with Autism) has encour-
2 Dautenhahn and Werry [19].
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aged children with autism to become more engaged in human
interactions.3 In a pilot study, the autonomous humanoid
KASPAR robot taught children with autism to engage in
collaborative play through a video game. It found that the
children were more engaged by the robot than the human
counterpart (though the children showed more examples of
collaborative play and cooperation when playing with the
human adult).4 Robots can also teach young children with
illness or disabilities to deal with them.5 The report on robot
Matilda6 that was trialed in Australian residential aged care
facilities indicated a statistically significant improvement in
the emotional and behavioural engagement of the older peo-
ple suffering from dementia with the social robot [39]. To
deal with physical disabilities, leg rehabilitation robots allow
for physiotherapy7 and gait assessment robots can capture
gait parameters to customise rehabilitation interventions and
exercises to cater to the patient’s needs.8
Notwithstanding the substantial benefits (actual and
potential) that carebots can bring to the vulnerable segments
of the population, it is first and foremost, observed that there
are unique challenges arising from the use of carebots. These
challenges relate to issues of both ethical design and the pub-
lic or users’ trust in carebots. The second part notes that
the existing ethical theories (of utilitarianism, deontology
and virtue ethics) as well as ethical guidelines, standards
and regulations on robots do not provide an overall ethi-
cal framework which developers can take into account in
the design of robots or sufficiently concrete principles for
application to the caring contexts. The third part will then
argue for the Ethics of Care as the most appropriate ethical
framework that can apply to the caring contexts. This central
framework, together with the tenets of Principlism (compris-
ing autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence and justice) and
other ethical theories (utilitarianism, deontology and virtue
3 Dautenhahn and Werry [19, p. 5].
4 Wainer et al. [85].
5 Alemi et al. [1] and Meghdari et al. [47, 48] relating to children
suffering from cancer; Meghdari et al. [49] on children with hearing
disabilities.
6 The social robot was jointly developed by NEC Japan and RECCSI
(Research Centre for Computers, Communication and Social, Innova-
tion) of La Trobe University in Melbourne. It possesses human-like
attributes such as baby-face appearance, human voice, facial expres-
sions, gestures and body movements and is able to recognise voices,
human faces, emotions and possesses speech acoustics recognition.
7
“Assistive Technologies to Improve Healthcare quality, productivity”
MIS Today, 27 Feb 2016.
8
“Charting the way to hospitals of the future” 23 January 2018
at https://edb.gov.sg/en/news-and-resources/insights/innovation/
charting-the-way-to-hospitals-of-the-future.html (accessed on 20
February 2019). These rehabilitative robots are developed by The
Centre for Healthcare Assistive & Robotics Technology (CHART) in
Singapore.
ethics) can deal with the current challenges presented by the
use of carebots.
2 Challenges in the Use of Carebots
Robots may be defined as artificial beings possessing the four
characteristics of mobility, interactivity, communication, and
autonomy [UNESCO 76, p. 4]. These robots may be powered
by artificial intelligence that includes the ability to reason,
communicate, and learn from its perception of the surround-
ing environment, past experiences and even errors. It is artifi-
cial intelligence that enables them to respond in socially inter-
active ways with humans. Advancements in machine learning
technology including deep learning and natural language pro-
cessing have significant potential to enhance the functionality
of social robots such as the care robots used in the healthcare
sector. The specific roles that carebots are expected to play
in healthcare however give rise to unique challenges.
1. Extent of robot care
Sparrow and Sparrow9 have argued that robots are inca-
pable of meeting the social and emotional needs of older
persons under their care. Robots do not understand human
frailties and therefore cannot show care for vulnerable peo-
ple. Moreover, the use of carebots may result in a decrease in
the amount of human contact experienced by the older per-
sons, which would be detrimental to their well-being. It is
unethical in their view to attempt to substitute robot simulacra
for genuine social interaction. The inability of robots to care
for humans and their increased role of robots in social inter-
actions give rise to potential problems of deception and over-
reliance on robots by users (which we will discuss below).
On this issue of the carebots’ inability to care, we should
take note of both internal and external aspects. The internal
aspect is that carebots lack human consciousness and do not
possess any human emotions.10 As such, they lack human
understanding as to how it feels to care for a human. It might
be argued, somewhat ironically, that the robot’s inability
to feel pain and suffering or experience vulnerability as
humans do accounts largely for their inability to show care
to humans.11
Technological developments suggest that robots have
the capacity to “perceive” human emotions and facial
9 Sparrow and Sparrow [68].
10 This does not necessarily mean robots cannot have internal states
that mirror human emotions and which can be communicated to humans
through facial expression, body posture and tone of voice: see Breazeal
and Brooks [10] on the Kismet social robot with three-dimensional
affect space of arousal; valence and stance.
11 Metzinger [50].
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expressions.12 For example, Huggable was designed for
therapeutic applications in nursing homes. The interactive
social robot possesses the neural network to recognise nine
different classes of affective touch and can react accordingly.
Another example is the Model of User’s Emotions which
has been developed for the healthcare industry to assess
patients’ emotions from various sources (including heart
rate, breathing pattern, temperature, vocal characteristics
and facial expressions). As Wallach and Allen described,
technology has enabled the translation of sensory data such
that they can be received as “cognitive representations of
emotions”.13 This does not mean, however, that robots are
capable of perceiving real human emotions or capable of
having emotions as humans do.
Despite this internal incapacity to care, carebots are
capable of exhibiting the external or ‘outward’ aspect of
care. Robots can be designed to respond to humans and
human behaviours in a manner that may be perceived as
‘caring’ by the human care recipients. The external aspect
of care may be demonstrated through words importing
kindness and encouragement, a gentle pat on the back of
the care recipient or a programmed smile on a humanoid
carebot without the carebot possessing any corresponding
(internal) emotions. The philosopher John Searle [62]
has demonstrated in his famous Chinese room illustration
that AI systems lack true understanding of the Chinese
language terms being processed by them. The computer
receives inputs on Chinese language terms and produces
Chinese characters as outputs. Despite not understanding
these Chinese terms, the computer would be able to pass
the Turing test [75] (that is, to convince a Chinese speaker
that it possesses knowledge of the Chinese language) by
“simulating” an understanding of the Chinese language.
Thus, the computer does not possess a “mind” or “think” the
way humans do. Indeed, Turing [75] had remarked that the
question “could a machine think?” was in itself meaningless.
Drawing an analogy from human–human interactions, the
fact that a human cannot read the (internal) minds and emo-
tions of other humans does not prevent him from showing
the external aspect of care to another human being. In truth,
the “appearance” of emotions are not real human emotions.
Nonetheless, the absence of (internal) human emotions in
robots can be compensated for by the robots’ external appear-
ances and behaviour. Coeckelbergh [15] conjectured that
advanced human–robot communications can be analogised
to normal human–human interactions in that both can inter-
pret “the other’s appearance and behaviour as an emotion”.14
This approach requires a shift in mindset “from the ‘inside’
12 Pour et al. [57].
13 Wallach and Allen [86, p. 152].
14 Coeckelbergh [15, p. 238].
(what is ‘in the mind’ of robots) to the ‘outside’ (what robots
do to us)” in personal, social and emotional contexts.15
2. Deception
Indeed, it is this ability of carebots to exhibit “external”
care that gives rise to the problem of deception. Carebots that
aim to imitate a human companion or caregiver raise the pos-
sibility that the user (especially the vulnerable) will be unable
to judge whether they are communicating with a real person
or with technology. This could be experienced as a form
of deception or fraud.16 Can the deception be regarded as
benevolent or benign? Does that make the deception morally
permissible?
The form that the carebot takes may be significant. Coeck-
elbergh et al. [17] indicated that zoomorphic robots may be
less problematic than robots that look too much like humans.
This does not imply that anthropomorphic designs should be
prohibited. In fact, anthropomorphic designs of robots are
arguably desirable if they advance the function of the tech-
nology17 such as to encourage the use of or interactions with
a robot for the patient’s well-being.
Grodzinsky et al. [33] regarded deception by appearances
as a question of trust.18 A robot is deceptive where it
misleads the human user into believing that or behaving as
if the robot is a human or animal. They argue that where the
software developer has used deception in the design of the
robot in order to help the user, the deception is considered
benign and does not involve a breach of trust. For example,
manipulations or deceptions of a robot for the purpose of
calming a patient with dementia which might otherwise
cause injury to the hospital staff or others would be benign
without involving any breach of trust and are thereby morally
permissible.19 The underlying basis for Grodzinsky et al.
[33] appears to be the positive consequences generated
or the avoidance of negative consequences or harms. This
is analogous to the justification for therapeutic privilege
exercised by doctors to withhold relevant information from
the patient about their health condition if the disclosure of
information is likely to cause serious physical or mental
harm to the patient. But if the developer manipulates the
user and does not act in the user’s best interests, there is a
breach of trust which cannot be condoned.20
15 Coeckelbergh [14, p. 219].
16 Mittelstadt [51].
17 Darling [18].
18 See Burrell [12] on the economic and social inequalities that can
arise from the opacity of machine learning algorithms including her
examples concerning Internet fraud and spam filtering.
19 Grodzinsky et al. [33, p. 97].
20 Grodzinsky et al. [33, at p. 97].
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The default position should be that deception is morally
wrong due to deontological grounds (e.g., respect for
humanity) and because they offend the virtues of honesty
and trustworthiness. They argued that an exception should
apply where the intention of the developer is ethical and the
consequences are good.21 Grodzinsky et al. [33] also added
that the deceptive feature should be an essential functionality
of the robot Isaac and Bridewell22 argued that deception-
capable robots can be ethical even when telling outright lies
and that the ethicality of human or robot communication
must be assessed with regard to its underlying motives
(such as the achievement of pro-social goals and functions).
However, Isaac and Bridewell were concerned with social
interactions and conversations between robots and people
generally as opposed to the relationship between carebots
and the very young and the elderly who are vulnerable and
require assistance.
Taking Grodzinsky et al. [33] as laying the basic require-
ments, I would argue that deception by carebots with regard to
vulnerable persons may be allowed only if (a) the intention of
the developer is ethical with respect to the care recipients, (b)
the consequences are indeed positive for the care recipient,
(c) there are no viable alternatives to the use of deception; and
(d) the extent of infringement of the care recipient’s auton-
omy is not more than that via other means. The additional
two requirements (c) and (d) would further protect the vul-
nerable children and elderly from deceptive robots. Consider
the analogy to lying to a dementia patient using Simulated
Presence. This is a device developed for Alzheimer’s patients
comprising an audiotape that records the telephone conver-
sation of the family member concerning his or her memories
of the patient. Even if the tape is played back repeatedly
via a device that looks like a telephone, the Alzheimer’s
patient may not realise and continue to regard it as a fresh
conversation.23 This is a form of deception; however, the
underlying motive is arguably to improve the patients’ emo-
tional well-being. It must be shown that the device would
in fact enhance the patients’ emotional well-being. It must
also be asked whether there are alternatives to Simulated
Presence which do not deceive and whether it might be fea-
sible to instead invest time to carry out real conversations
with patients.24 Where there are no viable alternatives to the
use of the device, and the extent of infringement of personal
autonomy is not more than via other means, such deception
may be justified as benign vis-à-vis the care recipient and
thus morally permissible.
The question of trust can also be assessed from the users’
perspective which may in turn depend on the level of com-
21 Grodzinsky et al. [33, p. 99].
22 Isaac and Bridewell [37].
23 Schermer [61, p. 160].
24 Schermer [61, p. 165].
munications between the robot developers and users.25 It is
possible that though the patients know that the robot is not
real, they have chosen to invest emotionally in the robots
nonetheless. Humans can trust artificial agents on an emo-
tional level instead of merely being dependent on them for
practical functionality even if the humans know for a fact that
they are only machines.26 Mentally healthy humans who are
aware that they are interacting with a robot are not deceived.27
In such a case, there is arguably no breach of trust.
Hoorn and Winter [35] found in a study that, insofar as
delivering bad health news to patients is concerned, the par-
ticipants preferred the robot doctor and the robot’s message
to the human counterpart. Moreover, the robot garnered more
compliance to the medical treatment. They noted that robots
may outperform humans on emotional tasks and this can
relieve physicians from the demanding duty of disclosing
unfavourable information to a patient.
3. Over-reliance on and over-attachment to carebots.
Over-reliance can adversely affect both care recipients and
caregivers. Caregivers may be over-reliant on robots to do
the caring work, and technology (for example, to aid patients
with motor impairment) may at times impede the improve-
ment in health conditions of care recipients (where the care
recipient refuses to make the attempt to walk without techno-
logical assistance). Vulnerable patients may also suffer from
over-attachment to carebots. It is commonly found that chil-
dren suffer from distress and grief when separated from their
robot companions28 and the reliance on carebots without
adult guidance may impede the development of interactive
abilities of babies and infants in the long term.29 As men-
tioned above, carebots do not possess human attributes such
as compassion.30 Clinical practice often involves complex
judgments and abilities that AI technology is currently unable
to replicate, such as contextual knowledge and the ability to
read social cues.31 Concerns have been raised about a loss
of human contact and increased social isolation if AI tech-
nologies are used to replace therapists or family time with
patients.32
25 See Felzmann et al. [24] on relational understanding of transparency
that is dependent on the communication between technology providers
and users, where trustworthiness is assessed based on contextual factors
that mediate the value of such communications including factors that
make transparency meaningful and trustworthy in the users’ eyes.
26 Grodzinsky et al. [33].
27 Coeckelbergh [16, p. 288].
28 Riek and Howard [58].
29 Sharkey and Sharkey [64].
30 Parks [56].
31 Loder and Nicholas [44].
32 Sharkey and Sharkey [63].
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In addition, if caregivers rely on carebots to take over the
caring tasks, less time will be spent on human–human inter-
actions. Vallor argued that caregiving teaches us reciprocity
and empathy.33 Thus, carebots should not “liberate” us from
care but instead provide support that draw us into care-giving
practices.34 To mitigate the problem of over-reliance (and
over-trust) by care recipients, human designers may consider
suitable measures such as providing warning indicators or
built-in tasks that requires the attention of the user from time
to time.35
Given the challenges of using carebots, it is proposed that
carebots should not replace human caregivers in interacting
directly with the patient but merely assist the human care-
giver in supporting or taking care of the patient.36 Where the
carebots are used as social companions and for social inter-
actions together with human caregivers to care for those who
are vulnerable, the risk of over-reliance or over-attachment
to the robots is mitigated. Coeckelbergh et al.37 suggested
that we should develop and use robots based on the notion
of “supervised autonomy”. This would likely create more
trust among stakeholders and improve the quality of the
therapy. Vallor [77]38 has also noted that the use of care-
bots can deprive potential caregivers of goods (such as the
virtues of reciprocity and empathy or, applying the capabil-
ities approach,39 the preservation and enhancement of their
human capacities for affiliation, practical reason and emo-
tion) that she considered to be central to care practices.
4. Informed consent to use of carebots and patient privacy
As the use of carebots may bring risks for the patients and
users, the procedures of obtaining informed consent should
be customised to ensure each patient understands the pur-
pose and risks from using carebots. The patient’s consent
to the use of carebots has to be voluntarily and unequivocal.
Greater caution should be exercised in the communication of
the relevant information to children and elderly patients prior
to obtaining consent. In particular, the patient’s knowledge
or lack thereof about the potential restraints on the patient’s
desire for independent living, and the deprivations of liberty
or privacy that he or she may be subject to with the use of
carebots should be taken into account; and such restraints or
deprivations should be balanced against the potential benefits
of safety and security that may be afforded by the carebots’
33 Vallor [78, p. 223].
34 Vallor [78, p. 226].
35 Borenstein et al [9, p. 135; 84].
36 European Parliament [22, at para 32].
37 Coeckelbergh et al. [17].
38 Vallor [77].
39 See Nussbaum [54] cited in Coeckelbergh [15].
role.40 For persons who are not mentally capable of giving
consent such as the very young children or elderly patients
with advanced dementia, there may be a need to consider
proxy decision-making with respect to the use of carebots.41
Carebots capture, store and process personal and sensi-
tive data about the care recipient’s health conditions and
movements. They are networked devices that collect, store or
process the data from various localities and in the cloud. The
typical care recipient especially the young children and the
elderly may not be aware of the significant data-processing
capacity of carebots. Significant amounts of personal data
and confidential information such as the health conditions
and emotional responses of the care recipient during social
interactions may be disclosed to and stored in the carebot42
to which the robotics companies have access. There is a risk
that the collection and disclosure of the data by carebots
during such interactions including intimate situations would
infringe privacy rights and thereby cause embarrassment to
users. There is an additional risk that the database contain-
ing information on the patients’ health conditions might be
hacked or retrieved by unauthorised third parties. It is indeed
timely to pay more attention to security and privacy issues
with respect to data used for communication between people
and robots and artificial intelligence [23].43
As a summary, it is pertinent to highlight that none of
the abovementioned challenges (carebots’ limited extent of
care, the possibility of deception on vulnerable humans,
(over)reliance and (over)attachment to carebots, and the lack
of informed consent and potential infringement of users’ pri-
vacy), serious as they are, would suggest that the use of all
forms and types of care robots should be banned. Instead,
we should pay close attention to the possibility of abuse and
advocate the appropriate design of carebots according to eth-
ical principles with a view to engender and maintain trust. We
will now examine these concepts of trust and ethical design
and their inter-relationship.
3 Trust
Human beings seek to adapt to their environment by reduc-
ing complexity and uncertainty. Trust is one mechanism that
allows humans to cope with this complexity and uncertainty
[45]. On one level, human trust in another person or thing is
based on belief. Gambetta [29] stated that trust depends on
the “subjective probability with which an agent assesses that
40 Leenes et al. [42, at p. 22].
41 Ienca et al. [36].
42 Fosch-Villaronga and Albo-Canals [26 at p. 83].
43 Para 125.
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another agent or group of agents will perform a particular
function”.44
Taddeo [70] has laid further groundwork on the concept
of trust (and e-trust). E-trust occurs in environments which
there is no direct or physical contact and, in this regard, may
not be entirely applicable to human interactions with social
or care robots. However, certain concepts of trust remain
relevant for our purposes. First, she noted that trust is a rela-
tion between A (the trustor) and B (the trustee). The trustee
can be a human or artificial entity. Second, trust is a “deci-
sion” by A to delegate to B some aspect of importance to
A in achieving a goal in which A’s decisions are “designed
and implemented with the assumption that there is a high
probability that B will behave as expected”. Third, Taddeo
observed that trust involves risk and that “the less information
the trustor A has about the trustee B, the higher the risk and
the more trust is required”. Fourthly, the A has the expecta-
tion of gain by trusting B. Fifthly, positive outcomes that are
generated when A trusts B encourage A to continue trusting
B.45 Taddeo’s model essentially relied on the ‘rational agent”
which is capable of making the “best option for itself, given
a specific scenario and a goal to achieve”.46 In Taddeo [71],
she referred to the quantification of risks underlying trust
based on the ratio of successful actions to the total number
of actions necessary to achieve the goal.
Ferrario et al. [25] noted that apart from pragmatic reasons
for trusting an AI system dependent on the expectation of
gain from trusting, there may also be epistemic reasons for
trusting which are based on the trustor’s belief in the trustee’s
trustworthiness. The AI system may be viewed as trustworthy
in (a) a relative sense in the context of the trust relationship
from a person’s perspective but not another or (b) an absolute
sense where there are objective reasons that make the AI
system trustworthy for everyone whatever the contexts. The
model on trust discussed thus far can be further extended
in three ways: first, trust is not based on purely cognitive
or rational beliefs but there is the other aspect of “attitude”;
second, by incorporating normative features and thirdly, by
extending the range of stakeholders involved.
First, human trust in care robots cannot be assessed based
on rational grounds alone given the issues we have raised
in the section above on subjective human perceptions of the
roles, functions and appearances of care robots and poten-
tial deception by such robots. Jones [38]47 regarded trust as
an “affective attitude” with the implication that we are jus-
tified to trust even when we are not justified in predicting a
favourable outcome from the person being trusted. Gompei
44 Gambetta [29, p. 217].
45 I have omitted Taddeo’s point that “The trustee B may or may not
be aware that trustor A trusts B”. This is merely a neutral feature.
46 Taddeo [71, p. 244].
47 At p. 15. See also Kirkpatrick et al. [40]
and Umemuro [31] have studied both concepts of cognitive
and affective trust of humans as applied to their interactions
with social robots.
On the second point relating to the normative features
of trust, Buechner and Tavani [11] have described trust as
“a (moral or nonmoral) normative relationship affecting two
agents”—A and B—in which “A has the disposition to nor-
matively expect that B will do such and such responsibly.”48
Tuomela and Hofmann [74] distinguished rational social nor-
mative trust (based on the trustor’s social right to expect the
trustee’s intentional good-willed performance) from predic-
tive trust and reliance which are reason-based beliefs about
the trustee’s intentional good-willed performance. Grounds
for the abovementioned ‘social right” to expect the trustee’s
intentional good-willed performance include friendship, sin-
cere agreement, and a relationship governed by mutually
respected social norms.
Trust should not be defined narrowly as the “decision”
taken by the trustor with respect to the trustee or the dele-
gated task. Rather, it can also explain the basis that underlies
the decision (for example, as in the statement “I decide to del-
egate to B because I trust B to achieve the goal”). This will
naturally lead to the question “why should I trust B” which in
turns triggers the examination of the normative basis for trust.
The third point concerns the range of stakeholder inter-
ests49 (that is, who do you trust?). Trustees in question may
include not merely the artificial entity or carebot but also the
manufacturer of the carebot or the software developers of the
artificial intelligence system to be used for the carebot. The
trustors cover consumers, users and members of the public.
We should also consider the social norms applicable to the
range of stakeholders whether it is between the consumers
and users of care robots and/or the human designers of the
care robots.
In sum, trust is a relational and normative concept. The
idea of trust implies some uncertainty or risks that delega-
tion of task to artificial agent may not proceed as planned.
Whether trust exists and the extent thereof depends on the
trustor as a rational agent weighing the potential benefits
and losses from reliance on the artificial systems. The rea-
sons may be pragmatic or epistemic. Apart from the rational
aspects, human affective attitudes towards care robots should
be taken into account. Moreover, the applicable social norms
and stakeholders’ interests are also part of the trust concept.
Trust is also an instrumental concept in that trust can lead
to certain positive ends. With respect to care robots, engen-
dering human trust in such robots will potentially facilitate its
48 Buechner and Tavani [11].
49 This focus on stakeholders is also consistent with the notion of
Responsible Research and Innovation that take account of societal
impacts under the European Union’s Framework Programmes for
Research and Technological Development: see Von Schomberg [83].
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widespread use in the healthcare sector. Conversely, distrust
arising from a mishap in the use of care robots can easily ham-
per the applications of care robots in the healthcare sector. At
the same time, we should also guard against “overtrust” of
robots that can arise from automation bias where the human
underestimates the “loss associated with a trust violation”
and/or “the chance the robot will make such a mistake”.50
4 Ethical Design
Ethical Design refers to the process by which ethical values
or principles are taken into account or embedded in the
design process of a product or device or technology. The
ethical values and principles may be taken into account in
two ways via a “top-down” approach (by feeding in advance
a set of ethical principles embedded in the robot algorithm)
or a “bottom up” approach (in which machine learning
adapts and learns about an external set of values and prin-
ciples based on the robots’ observations of humans, human
behaviours and the operative environment) or a combination
of both approaches.51 The first two methods represent ideal
types. The top-down approach selects in advance a theory
to apply and analyses the requirements for the design of
algorithms and subsystems in order to implement the the-
ory.52 The task of determining the universal ethical values
or principles in advance for carebots under the “top-down”
approach is at best unwise (and at worst, impossible). We
need to pay attention to the particular contexts in which
these values or principles are meant to apply.
On the other hand, the “bottom-up” approach assesses
a task based on a performance measure and the outcomes
are analysed after fulfilment of the performance measure in
order to yield a theory.53 The expectation or demand that the
machine learning platform in a carebot generate appropriate
ethical values and principles from the carebot’s perceptions
of humans and human behavior would be impracticable. We
would need to least supply the carebot a preliminary ethical
framework or a set of ethical reference points.
In practice, ethical design is inevitably the product of
both the “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches.54 In this
regard, a basic ethical framework should be in place to guide
the actions and decisions of the carebot in the initial stages;
and the carebot should also be enabled to “learn” from the
environment and contexts it encounters and be permitted to
make adjustments to the ethical framework or even develop
50 Wagner et al. [84 at 22].
51 Banavar [6].
52 Wallach and Allen [86, pp. 79–80].
53 Wallach and Allen [86, p. 80].
54 For a macro-perspective of the regulatory process of robot gover-
nance, see Fosch-Villaronga and Heldeweg [27].
new moral norms within the parameters of the general ethical
framework. As Wallach and Allen put it, it is the “dynamic
interplay” between the analysis of project structure and test-
ing of system designed to reach goals.55
The design process may cover aspects such as the physical
form the robot takes, the way it communicates, the contents
of the communication, the actions or practices it is capable of
carrying out and the contexts in which they operate. To prop-
erly design carebots, the designer will have to be aware of the
contexts in which the carebots will be utilised in the health-
care sector, the challenges arising from the use of robots in
caregiving, and also their potential impact (in physical, men-
tal and social terms) on humans (both care recipients and
caregivers) in those specific contexts.
Similar to the concept of trust, there is also a need to take
account of the range of stakeholders’ interests—of the patient
and their loved ones, the healthcare professionals, caregivers,
manufacturers and software developers—in ethical design.
Polls may, for example, be taken of potential users of carebots
such as the aged56 in order to build “democratic spaces” for
the voices of stakeholders to be heard.57 There is also a need
to consider the cognitive dimension of the user and his needs
in the design process so as to develop robot care technology
or devices that he can better use or interact with.58
Public trust in technology is dependent on whether the
technology generates benefits for humans, improves their
well-being and ensures safety. Should there be an accident or
mishap in its use, distrust can easily creep in. Whether trust
can be regained will depend on the efficiency and reliability
of investigations and the follow-up actions by the developer
and authorities. Another aspect is the consistency of function-
ality and performance of the technology such as carebots. In
this regard, artificial agents are generally more predictable
than humans and hence more trustworthy. 59 Whether the
technology performs its role and functions for which it is
designed (such as the roles of caring for its users’ health
and the enhancement of human–robot interactions for users’
mental well-being through, for example, displaying “socially
acceptable” emotions)60 will be important for engendering
55 Wallach and Allen [86, p. 81].
56 Sparrow and Sparrow [68].
57 Vandemeulebroucke et al. [81].
58 Fosch-Villaronga and Özcan [28].
59 Grodzinsky et al [32, p. 26].
60 Ojha et al [55] on the development of the Ethical Emotion Generation
System (EEGS) based on data structure of emotions represented in the
form of (Name, Valence, Degree, Threshold, Intensity, Decay Time),
where Name denotes the name for the type of the emotion, Valence
specifies whether the emotion is positive or negative, Degree represents
the extent of the positivity and negativity of the emotion, Threshold rep-
resents the minimum intensity required to trigger the emotion, Intensity
represents the strength of the emotional experience and Decay Time
denotes the time required to drop the emotion intensity back to 0.
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trust in the technology. Finally, the ethical design of carebots
can and should take account of potential risks arising from
humans’ automation bias that result in overtrust in robots.
Thus, in terms of concept and purpose, both trust and eth-
ical design are well aligned insofar as the use of carebots is
concerned. I will also argue that there are appropriate cri-
teria we can consider for the promotion of trustworthy and
ethically designed carebots in the healthcare context.
5 Finding the Right Ethical Framework
for the Design of Carebots
The ethical design of carebots may involve the translation of
abstract ethical principles into concrete rules of action to be
programmed into or to be taken into account in the design of
the carebot. As mentioned above, a combination of the “top-
down” and the “bottom-up” approaches will be required in
practice. Both Utilitarianism and Deontological Ethics (Kan-
tianism) are essentially “top-down” theories. Virtue ethics is
more akin to the “bottom-up” approach. I argue that Ethics
of Care with its sub-level principles and complemented by
Principlism can integrate the abstract and the particular in
a manner that is sensitive to the various caring contexts and
would be most appropriate for promoting trust and the ethical
design of carebots.
Utilitarianism assesses ethical decision-making by refer-
ence to the sum of happiness to the greatest number. In so
doing, a utilitarian would have to assess the relative weights
of pleasures and pains arising from an action and determine
the future effects from the perspective of an impartial specta-
tor. Bernard Williams says the agent must be omniscient and
benevolent to make a proper utilitarian assessment. Such a
task is virtually impossible for a robot. If Utilitarianism were
to be applied to the design of a carebot, it would at best be a
truncated or partial version. Decisions would have to be made
under “bounded rationality” so to speak. One method to cir-
cumvent the problem might be to resort to rule utilitarianism
as a rule of thumb based on overall costs and benefits for sim-
ilar actions or situations. However, the rules of thumb (for
example, killing is wrong) must be determined in advance
for them to be useful for the ethical design of carebots.
The Kantian deontological ethics is premised on two
main categorical imperatives: (1) universalisation of stan-
dards (“act only according to the maxim by which you can
at the same time will that it should become a universal law”)
and (2) to treat humanity, whether in your own person or that
of another, always as an end and never as a means only. These
are strict and universal rules applied without exception. For
example, lying is wrong according to Kant as universalizing
the maxim of lying would give rise to a fundamental contra-
diction and impossibility in communications. As such, lying
would not be condoned even if the purpose were to save a
life.
Designing algorithms to capture the universal principles
would be daunting. With respect to the first categorical imper-
ative, the carebot would first have to recognise goals for its
own actions, assess the effects of all other moral agents try-
ing to achieve the same goals by acting in the same way
in comparable circumstances and would need to possess an
understanding of human psychology.61 As for the second
categorical imperative, the carebot should have no problem
with the concept of using a human being as a means to an
end (which is based on the logic of “if X, then Y”) but would
also have to understand the wholly different concept of what
it means to treat a human being as an end in itself (an onto-
logical concept). The latter would be extremely challenging
if not impossible for the robot.
Virtue ethics contains an entire array of different virtues
for selection. The contexts in which a particular virtue (such
as kindness) may apply are wide-ranging. The determination
of the rational “mean” of a particular virtue depends on the
subjective disposition of the actor in the circumstances he
is placed in. Put in another way, the right action is one that
would be selected by the virtuous agent. As the focus of
virtue ethics is on building human character and humanity
through practices and experiences, it is more in line with the
“bottom-up” approach similar to “connectionism” in terms
of training and development.62 There are no definitive ethical
norms to inform the moral actor what he or she ought to do.63
According to Aristotle, virtue ethics did not provide a precise
“algorithm” of action even though the moral actor in virtue
ethics will aim at human flourishing as the ultimate good.
Virtue and care ethics overlap in that they both focus
on practice and values. Slote [65], for example, treats care
as virtue. Vallor in Technology and the Virtues speaks of
“technomoral care” as a “skillful, attentive, responsible and
emotionally responsive disposition to personally meet the
needs of others who share our technosocial environment”.64
That being said, it is fair to regard care ethics as focusing
essentially on relationships whilst virtue ethics emphasise
disposition and human character.
In the Christian and Confucian versions, virtue ethics also
takes account of the golden rule of reciprocity (do to others
what you want others to do to you). The algorithm would
have to be sufficiently complex to take into account the arti-
ficial agent’s observed effect of others’ actions on itself, and
assess consequences of its own actions on the others’ affec-
61 Wallach and Allen [86, p. 98].
62 See for example Patricia Churchland on connectionist learning for
moral cognition.
63 This was what Swanton [69, p. 273] termed the “problem of inde-
terminacy”.
64 Vallor [78, p. 221].
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tive states.65 With respect to care ethics, we will discuss
below more concrete sub-level principles for application to
the caring contexts.
With respect to the healthcare context in particular, Prin-
ciplism advocated by Tom Beauchamp and James Childress
has been influential. It comprises four principles:
1. Autonomy—a norm of respecting and supporting
autonomous decisions.
2. Non-maleficence—a norm of avoiding the causation of
harm.
3. Beneficence—a group of norms pertaining to relieving,
lessening, or preventing harm and providing benefits
against risks and costs.
4. Justice—a group of norms for fairly distributing benefits,
risks and costs.66
From the above norms, derivative rules such as “tell the
truth”, “keep your promises”, “protect the privacy of others
and do not pass on information in confidence” are gener-
ated.67 Applying to carebots in the healthcare context, the
principle of non-maleficence acts as a reminder to ensure
safety for the patients and vulnerable care recipients. Any
serious injury caused to the patients and care recipients by the
carebots would likely generate negative publicity and under-
mine trust. It is thus paramount to ensure safety in the use of
carebots especially since carebots interact on a regular basis
with vulnerable people. Harm may include physical or psy-
chological harm. Sorell and Draper68 advocated autonomy
as a priority with respect to the use of carebots. Unless the
elderly persons are cognitively impaired, they should have
the autonomy to make their own decisions in the use of the
robots. In exceptional circumstances, autonomy may be sac-
rificed if respecting autonomy would endanger the user’s life
or physical safety such as when the patient is making suicidal
requests. The robot should also report to or warn the patient
about accidents even if it is against the patient’s wishes.
MedEthEx (Medical Ethics Expert), an AI medical advi-
sor, adopted Ross’69 prima facie duties of autonomy, benefi-
cence and non-maleficence (which form part of Beauchamp
and Childress’ Principlism) with rules for weighing the dif-
ferent prima facie duties when they conflict in a particular
situation. MedEthEx has three components: a knowledge-
based interface to select “duty intensities” for a specific case,
an advisor module which determines the correct action by
consulting “learned knowledge” and a learning module that
65 Wallach and Allen [86, p. 98].
66 Beauchamp and Childress [7, pp. 12–13].
67 Childress [13, p. 68].
68 Sorell and Draper [67].
69 Ross [59].
abstracts guiding principles from particular cases provided
by a biomedical ethicist acting as a trainer.70 In the context of
reminding patients to take medication, for example, a balance
may be struck between respect for patient autonomy to skip
medicine on certain occasions and the potential harm to the
patient if the reminders are repeatedly ignored by reference
to a time-based formula.71 The humanoid robot, Nao, which
was developed by the French company Aldebaran Robotics,
receives instructions from the physician as to when to take
medication, the maximum amount of harm that will occur if
the patient does not take the medication, the length of time for
the maximum harm to occur, the maximum amount of benefit
from taking the medication and so on. Similar to MedEthEx,
the Nao robot decides based on the three duties of respecting
patient autonomy, non-maleficence and beneficence.72
The final principle of justice may feature in both public
(for example, in the allocation or distribution of healthcare
services to needy members of society) and private domains
(such as in the division of labour in a care-based institu-
tion and the relative treatment of different care recipients in
a hospital or nursing home). How do we design principles
of justice in carebots? The carebots could follow a simple
“first-come, first-served” rule; however, in the event of a pub-
lic health epidemic and when pharmaceuticals are in scarce
supply, the design of the carebots would have to take into
account and weigh the relative needs of the patients in the
institutional setting.73 Though there may be societal con-
cerns re the inequality of caring distributed in society and
the burdens on caregivers, such macro-justice considerations
need not be taken into account in the design of carebots. The
focus could instead be on interpersonal justice in terms of
the reciprocity between caregiver and care recipients in an
institutional setting.
5.1 Ethical Guidelines, Standards and Regulations
on Robots
In addition to the ethical theories (utilitarianism, deontology,
virtue ethics, and principlism) discussed above, there are sev-
eral emerging ethical guidelines, standards and regulations
pertaining specifically to the design of robots and other artifi-
cial intelligent systems.74 Regulation is itself a multi-faceted
70 Anderson and Anderson [2].
71 Wallach and Allen [86, pp. 128–129].
72 Anderson and Anderson [3].
73 Asaro [4, p. 14].
74 E.g. European Commission [21] (that trustworthy AI systems should
be (1) lawful, (2) ethical, and (3) robust from a technical and social per-
spective; and that ‘key requirements for Trustworthy AI are: (1) human
agency and oversight, (2) technical robustness and safety, (3) privacy
and data governance, (4) transparency, (5) diversity, non-discrimination
and fairness, (6) environmental and societal well-being and (7) account-
ability” (p. 4).
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exercise comprising the different modalities of law, market,
social norms, and technology. Most if not all of these stan-
dards are connected to and resonate with the existing ethical
theories. They are also consistent with the emphasis on eth-
ical design in this paper.
The European Parliament [22],75 as mentioned above,
whilst acknowledging the potential capacity of robots to
enhance the mobility and integration of people with dis-
abilities and elderly people, stressed that “humans will still
be needed in caregiving and will continue to provide an
important source of social interaction that is not fully replace-
able”. Subsequently, the European Parliament [23] noted the
enabling capacity of AI and robotics to allow doctors and
nurses to spend more time in high value activities including
patient interaction,76 and at the same time, recognised the
impact of the increased use of sensors in robotics to enable
patients to have “more personalised treatment and services
and receive care remotely from their own homes, while also
generating more meaningful data”.77
The IEEE Global Initiative on “Ethics of Autonomous and
Intelligent Systems. Ethically Aligned Design: A Vision for
Prioritizing Human Well-being with Autonomous and Intel-
ligent Systems”78 focus on the following general principles:
• Human Rights Ensure they do not infringe on internation-
ally recognized human rights.
• Well-being Prioritize metrics of well-being in their design
and use.
• Accountability Ensure that their designers and operators
are responsible and accountable.
• Transparency Ensure they operate in a transparent manner.
• Awareness of misuse Minimize the risks of their misuse.
On human rights, according to the UN Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the care recipient’s desire
for independent living should also be respected.79 A report
by the Rathenau Instituut has recommended an individual’s
right to choose to have meaningful human contact rather than
with a robot.80
The Foundation for Responsible Robotics81 highlights





standards/web/documents/other/ead_v2.pdf (accessed on 22 April
2019).
79 Article 19.
80 Van Est et al. [79] at para 3.9.2.
81 See https://responsiblerobotics.org/wpcontent/cache/page_
enhanced/responsiblerobotics.org//aboutus/mission//_index.html_
gzip (accessed on 22 April 2019).
constructed. Ethical decisionmaking begins in the R&D
phase.” The British Standards Institute Ethical Design of
Robots (BS 8611) identifies potential ethical harms arising
from robots and autonomous systems and provides guide-
lines on risk management associated with the ethical hazards.
The standard covers safe design, protective measures and
information for the design and application of different types
of robots, including those used for industrial, personal care
and medical purposes. According to the Engineering and
Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) Principles of
Robotics 2011,82 in addition to ethical design to ensure safety
and security, “[r]obots should be designed; operated as far as
is practicable to comply with existing laws & fundamental
rights & freedoms, including privacy.” Special reference was
made to robots used in the healthcare sector and the impor-
tance of data privacy and protection:
a robot used in the care of a vulnerable individual may
well be usefully designed to collect information about
that person 24/7 and transmit it to hospitals for medi-
cal purposes. But the benefit of this must be balanced
against that person’s right to privacy and to control their
own life e.g. refusing treatment. Data collected should
only be kept for a limited time; again the law puts cer-
tain safeguards in place. Robot designers have to think
about how laws like these can be respected during the
design process (e.g. by providing off-switches).
Further, “[robots]… should not be designed in a deceptive
way to exploit vulnerable users; instead their machine nature
should be transparent.” Two of Murphy and Wood’s Three
Laws of Responsible Robotics state that:
• A human may not deploy a robot without the human–robot
work system meeting the highest legal and professional
standards of safety and ethics.
• A robot must respond to humans as appropriate for their
roles.
In the Future of Life Institute Asilomar Principles for Ben-
eficial AI (Jan 2017), the two principles with a focus on
design are:
Value Alignment Highly autonomous AI systems should be
designed so that their goals and behaviors can be assured
to align with human values throughout their operation.
Human Values AI systems should be designed and oper-
ated so as to be compatible with ideals of human dignity,
rights, freedoms, and cultural diversity.
82 See https://epsrc.ukri.org/research/ourportfolio/themes/engineering
/activities/principlesofrobotics/ (accessed on 20 February 2019).
123
International Journal of Social Robotics
In addition, ISO 1348283 specifies guidelines for safe
design and protective measures in respect of personal care
robots (mobile servant robot, physical assistant robot and
person carrier robot).
Drawing from the above discussion on ethical guidelines,
standards and regulations, the ethical design of carebots
should focus on a few crucial aspects: safety and security,
respect for human rights such as the right to independent liv-
ing, meaningful contact with humans, dignity and privacy,
transparency, freedom from deception and the accountability
of human designers of AI.84 Following Murphy and Wood,
it is also important to consider the proper “role” morality of
carebots in response to humans especially care recipients.
Notwithstanding that the above ethical guidelines, standards
and regulations are consistent with the main challenges with
respect to carebots, they are fairly general in nature and do not
provide sufficiently concrete guidance as to how the ethical
design of carebots should be approached. I propose below the
Ethics of Care as a central ethical framework with sub-level
principles applicable to the caring contexts in the healthcare
sector.
6 The Ethics of Care
The story of Ethics of Care began with Gilligan’s In a
Different Voice in reaction to Kohlberg’s scale of moral devel-
opment from children to ethics grounded in universality and
rationality in adulthood. Gilligan [30] argued that women
tended to focus more on empathy, emotions and compassion
when discussing moral dilemmas at the expense of arguments
grounded in universality and rationality. One is not superior
to the other; they are merely different approaches to morality.
Several commentators have since built upon Gilligan’s ideas
and arguably established Ethics of Care either as an ethical
approach that supplements existing ethical theories or as a
standalone ethical theory.85
Noddings [53] viewed ethics of care as imposing an obli-
gation on us to act with an attitude or motive of caring
towards others. Instead of abstract general ethical principles,
the Ethics of Care is focused on the individual’s emotional
sensitivity to particular others. In addition, a person who cares
for another is “engrossed” in that other person; the former
does not impose his viewpoint on the other but rather gives
due attention to the latter’s perspective concerning the world
and his or her relationship to the world.86 Thus, both Gilli-
gan and Noddings take the position that “care ethics aims
83 See ISO at https://www.iso.org/standard/53820.html. Accessed
April 22, 2019.
84 Winfield and Jirotka [87, p. 3].
85 E.g. Slote [66].
86 Slote [66, p. 12].
to meet the concrete needs of individuals in context-specific
and responsive ways”.87
Care Ethics, according to Virginia Held [34], is premised
on a “caring relation” and care is a “practice” of responding
to needs.88 For her, care is both a practice and a value. Care
Ethics focuses on the agent’s ability to engage in the practice
of care and the exercise of that ability and not merely the
agent’s motives of caring.89 Persons are relational and inter-
dependent not individualistic autonomous rational agents.90
Care Ethics also values emotions [34, p. 10].
In contrast to Held, Slote [65] advocated an agent-based
virtue ethics of caring. He viewed the caring person as a
benevolent person who may prefer those who are near and
dear. In Ethics of Care and Empathy, Slote [66] affirmed that
ethics of care is rooted in “moral sentimentalism” and that
empathy is the “primary mechanism of caring, benevolence,
compassion, etc.”.91
Tronto [72] arguably provides the most important set of
concrete principles applicable to the caring contexts. First,
she defined good care as comprising both a caring attitude and
a caring activity. To her, care practices—as opposed to mere
tasks to be carried out—involve both “thought and action”
which are directed towards some end.92 Second, caring
entails four phases: caring about, taking care of, care-giving
and care-receiving.93 Tronto [73]94 argued for institution-
alised caring based on the purpose of care, a recognition of
power relations and the need for pluralistic and particular
tailoring of care to meet individual needs. In essence, it is
about “purpose, power and particularity”. Tronto [73] also
made the point that potential care recipients should be able
to “state what their needs are” and to make choices as to how
their needs can be met.95 For the caregivers, consideration
should be given to the negative aspect of the heavy burdens
of caregiving to the extent that “there was no space in our
lives outside of the circles of care”.96 Tronto laid down four
ethical elements of care:
1. Attentiveness—care requires a recognition of others’
needs in order to respond to them.
2. Responsibility—that we take upon ourselves to care for
others.
87 Engster [20, p. 2].
88 Held [34, p. 546].
89 Held [34, p. 51].
90 Held [34, p. 72].
91 Slote [66, p. 4].
92 Tronto [72, p. 108].
93 Tronto [72, pp. 105–108].
94 Tronto [73].
95 Tronto [73, p. 167].
96 Tronto [73, p. 167].
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3. Competence—skills in which care is given.
4. Responsiveness—the “responsiveness of the care
receiver to the care” in order to guide the caregiver.
Tronto’s four elements connect well with the challenges
encountered in the use of carebots as well as the tenets of
Principlism and the basic ethical theories of Utilitarianism,
Kantianism and Virtue ethics. The first element of attentive-
ness to patient needs constitutes one important step towards
advancing respect for patient autonomy. This element recog-
nises the need for the care recipient’s privacy (both physical
and informational privacy) to be respected. This would mean
that the informed consent of care recipients to the use of
carebots should be obtained. Yet the promotion of patient
autonomy can at times conflict with the aim to meet their
other needs (for example, when patients in exercising their
autonomy refuse medical treatment or medication to cure
their illness). Furthermore, some vulnerable patients may be
mentally incapable of exercising autonomy in which case the
decision to use carebots to cater to their needs must be made
in their best interests upon taking into consideration their
important physical and emotional needs Care ethics remains
particularly relevant for such vulnerable and dependent per-
sons such as patients, elderly, young children and disabled.
In Love’s Labor Revisited [41], Kittay argued that depen-
dency is not something exceptional but is in fact “integral”
to human life. At the same time, care recipients may not
wish to be overly dependent on human caregivers and in this
regard, the use of carebots could “liberate” the care recipient
from this feeling of dependence [8, p. 282].
The concept of “beneficence” in Beauchamp and Chil-
dress’ Principlism is related to the second element of
“responsibility”. Though we cannot always be certain that
human caregivers are exhibiting genuine care for their care
recipients, they must act professionally according to their
roles to benefit the care recipients in catering to their physical
and emotional needs. Vanlaere and Gastmans97 have sought
to justify care ethics by reference to the notion of “our own
personhood and the personhood of the vulnerable other”. It is
ultimately about human “dignity” in the relationship between
the caregiver as well as the care recipient.
Competence is linked to the skills and efficiency of the
caregiver in providing care. The achievement of excellence
in one’s craft or work (in this case, in providing care) is an
Aristotelean virtue.
Reciprocity is a common value in various ethical theo-
ries namely Utilitarianism, Kantianism and Virtue theory.
Such a notion is captured in Tronto’s fourth moral element
of “responsiveness” of the care recipient to the caregiver.
The relationship is reciprocal in order to ensure that the care-
giver’s objectives to provide care to the care recipient are
97 Vanlaere and Gastmans [82].
met. Held [34, p. 34, 35] opined that “[c]aring is a rela-
tion in which carer and cared-for share an interest in their
mutual well-being”. Hence, Tronto’s theory aims to benefit
both caregiver and care recipient.
Justice at the societal level may at first blush be perceived
as alien to the Ethics of Care with a focus on personal relation-
ships. Noddings commented that caring is “engrossment” in
the specific needs and desires of another person whilst justice
is a commitment to abstract principles and rules. But Ethics of
Care and justice are not diametrical opposites. Engster’s the-
ory of justice, for instance, is based on caring practices.98 In
fact, he goes further to advocate that the government ought to
establish institutional frameworks for supporting and accom-
modating caring practices.99
The partiality towards or prioritisation of close relation-
ships in the Ethics of Care does not present a problem for
carebots as long as the needs of the patients under their
assigned scope of duty are attended to. After all, similar to
the role of the doctors, nurses and healthcare professionals,
the carebot’s role should be to act in the best interests of spe-
cific patients under its care. However, basic justice concerns
should be adhered to. For example, patients in an institutional
setting with similar needs and placed in similar circumstances
should receive similar level of care from the assigned care-
bots within the institution.
7 Care Ethics for Trust in and Ethical Design
of Carebots
In view of the limitations of carebots in providing care to
humans, it is suggested that carebots should play an assistive
role in caregiving instead of replacing human caregivers. The
patient should continue to take care of, to the extent possi-
ble, his or her own health and well-being in conjunction with
the use of assistive robots100 for specific tasks forming part
of the care practice.101 The nurse should continue to play a
supervisory role in taking care of the patient including exer-
cising supervision over the robots delegated with the caring
tasks. In addition, the designer of carebots has to take into
consideration the specific caring tasks and ethical framework
in the design of carebots. Thus, in the overall caring context,
the human caregiver or nurse, the designer of carebots and
even the care recipient himself remain morally responsible
for the implementation and use of carebots.
98 Engster [20, p. 4].
99 Engster [20, p. 11].
100 Lehoux and Grimard [43, p. 334].
101 European Parliament [22, at para 32].
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Care Ethics coheres well with the World Health Organ-
isation’s framework for people-centred health102 based on:
patient safety, patient satisfaction, responsiveness to care,
human dignity, physical and psychological well-being. In
addition, the selection of Care Ethics as the central ethical
framework is justified by the following reasons:
(a) the availability of sub-level and sufficiently concrete
principles for application to the (health)care context,
(b) its coherence with Principlism (non-maleficence, benef-
icence, autonomy but less emphasis on macro-justice)
and basic tenets of existing ethical theories, and
(c) the close association between trust and Ethics of Care
in the caring context.
7.1 Care Ethics Offers Fairly Concrete Sub-level
Principles for Application to (Health)care
Context
van Wynsberghe [80]103 advocated the use of care values as
the foundational values to be integrated into carebots (which
she refers to as “care centered value-sensitive design”). The
value-based framework is meant to evaluate care robots in
an ethical manner both retrospectively and prospectively.
The retrospective stance allows the designers to consider the
impact of their design on care practices. According to the
prospective angle, the designers seek to integrate the ethical
framework in the design process. Van Wynsberghe’s analysis
is premised on Tronto’s care ethics, which are in turn based
on the moral elements of attentiveness, responsibility, com-
petence and reciprocity. In addition to providing a normative
account of the values in care, she took the view that the eth-
ical design process can “foster trust between the public and
the resulting robots”.
According to van Wynsberghe [80], the ethical framework
should cover the following components: context (hospital,
nursing home or home), practice (such as lifting and feed-
ing), the actors involved (nurse, patient and robot), the types
of robots (enabling, assistance versus replacement) and the
manifestation of moral elements (attentiveness, responsibil-
ity, competence and responsiveness).104
Attentiveness to care recipients’ needs cover not only their
physical needs but also their emotional needs for social inter-
action with human caregivers and carebots. Care recipients
should be sufficiently informed of the scope of use of care-
bots and potential use of confidential information. The care
recipient’s right to independent living and meaningful con-
tact with humans rather than robots if he so desires should
102 See http://iris.wpro.who.int/bitstream/handle/10665.1/5420/97892
90613176_eng.pdf. Accessed on April 22, 2019.
103 van Wynsberghe [80]. See also Salvini [60, p. 436].
104 van Wynsberghe [80, p. 420].
not be ignored. Caregivers and carebots ought to respect the
care recipients’ physical privacy (such as by not eavesdrop-
ping on human conversations, and helping to mitigate the
patient’s potential embarrassment or distress in having to
depend on their family members or relatives to take care of
their toileting or bathing). Other examples include deactivat-
ing the video monitors during intimate procedures,105 and
programming the carebots to announce their presence in the
midst of a human being especially in private spaces.
Although carebots cannot exhibit genuine human care
from the “internalist” perspective, they can nonetheless
discharge their responsibility towards care recipients by
showing outwardly caring behaviour towards them using AI
sensors and technology. Meacham and Studley [46] note that
a caring relation is based on a care environment formed by
gestures, movements and articulations that express attentive-
ness and responsiveness to vulnerabilities within the relevant
context. This partially endorses Tronto’s elements of atten-
tiveness and responsiveness. Carebots should not be used
to deceive vulnerable care recipients into thinking they are
human caregivers unless the underlying motive or purpose is
to improve the well-being of the care recipient, the well-being
of the care recipient is indeed enhanced, there are no viable
alternatives to achieve that purpose and the infringement is
not more serious than other means.
Carebots should be designed to have the competence to
carry out their tasks to fetch items for care recipients, aid
their transfer from bed to wheelchair and be equipped with
adequate machine learning to interact effectively with the
care recipients. This may also include the development of
acceptable AI models of emotions displayed by the robots in
their interactions with the users [55].
The responsiveness of care recipients to guide caregivers
in their caring roles suggest a notion of limited reciprocity
which is likely to depend in practice on the mental and physi-
cal condition of the care recipients to respond to the caregiver.
In line with Vanlaere and Gastmans’ “concept of “person-
hood” above, Khosla et al. [39] also referred to the need
for social robots to be designed to enable personalisation of
its services and contents to suit the preferences and health
conditions of aged people with dementia. They opined that
designing carebots with the social context in mind can “facil-
itate a long-term meaningful reciprocal relationship between
social robots and people with dementia”.106
7.2 Coherence with Other Ethical Theories
and Principlism
We have already encountered the material differences
amongst the ethical theories. Nevertheless, Care Ethics com-
105 Riek and Howard [58].
106 Khosla et al. [39, para 6.3].
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plemented by Principlism cohere with certain aspects of
the ethical theories discussed above. For example, Utilitar-
ianism—to the extent that it recognises the importance of
satisfaction of needs as part of the principle of maximising
the sum of happiness to the greatest number in the weigh-
ing of inter-subjective preferences—is relevant to Tronto’s
Ethics of Care that incorporates the moral element relating
to Attentiveness to Needs. Utilitarianism also resonates with
certain aspects of Principlism in that the former considers the
avoidance of harms (non-maleficence) and the generation of
benefits (Beneficence) in the overall utilitarian calculus.
Deontology is not merely about rational and universal
principles. The root of deontology also arises from the sen-
timental and emotional aspects of human nature.107 The
Kantian categorical imperative to respect humanity as an
end in itself is a case in point. Humanity can only be prop-
erly appreciated when we consider the rational, intellectual
as well as emotional aspects of being human. In this regard,
we need to respect the autonomy of the mentally capable
patients and elderly to make decisions for their own health,
an important ingredient in Principlism. The responsibility to
take care of others in the Ethics of Care is a duty or obliga-
tion of beneficence that is derived from Kantian categorical
imperatives and is again in line with Principlism.
Bearing in mind the critique of virtue ethics that it
depends entirely on what a virtuous agent would choose as a
right action without any epistemological grounding, Swan-
ton [69]108 proposed a target-centred virtue ethics according
to context. The aim of virtues of practice—which according
to Swanton includes virtues of focus on a problem, creative
virtues and “Dewey’s imaginative deliberation” and virtues
of dialogue109—is to arrive at right solutions by acting in a
virtuous way to solve problems. Every problem or dilemma
comes with constraints on its solutions (such as time and
costs, conflicts amongst virtues and their targets). Two virtues
may seem to conflict thus preventing the agent from making
a decision without sacrificing a virtue. The virtuous agent,
when he or she encounters an ethical problem requiring a
decision, will seek to “integrate constraints on solutions” to
the problems. This may sometimes involve modifying the
initial constraints to solutions in a way that increases the
possibilities for resolution. Swanton [69] gave the example
where the initial constraint of “keeping promise to children”
may be modified to “Be sincere. Show respect to the children
and consult with them. Maintain trust, enjoyment”.110 This
modification is made pursuant to the exercise of virtues of
107 Slote [66, p. 43].
108 See chapter 12 on “Virtues of Practice”.
109 Swanton [69, p. 253].
110 Swanton [69, p. 256].
practice. Resolving open-ended problems requires practical
wisdom, experience and expertise.111
This target-centred approach to virtue ethics does not
require the agent to act from inner motives. This approach
would prima facie suit robots which actions are not actu-
ated by inner motives. However, to apply this target-centred
virtue ethics, the algorithm would have to be capable of
modifying the initial constraint from a strict principle (or pro-
hibition) into one that is more general and contextual based
on the virtues of practice. The added complication is that the
processes for exercising these latter virtues are themselves
open-ended or ill-structured rendering the task of design-
ing algorithms to capture the nuances difficult indeed. At
the same time, this complication reflects the unpredictable
workings of human consciousness and behaviour. The human
mind, according to Swanton [69, p. 280], is a “pattern com-
pleter” rather than a “logic machine” applying strict rules.
Principlism (with the norms of non-maleficence, benefi-
cence and autonomy) can be integrated into the care practices.
The example of robots administering medication to patients
in a hospital or nursing home is apt. The design of the care-
bot must strike a judicious balance between giving the patient
autonomy to decide and ensuring that potential harms to the
patient’s physical and mental health are avoided and that his
or her health needs are met. Though carebots are not capa-
ble of exhibiting genuine human care towards others, they
must be designed to exhibit caring behaviour towards the
care recipients and promote their well-being (beneficence) at
least from the “external” angle. Moreover, through empathic
caring for others which also involves an obligation to respect
them, the “relational” character of autonomy is emphasised
in Care Ethics [66, p. 56].
For carebots, the idea of justice in the macro-societal con-
text may not be necessary. The carebot is typically assigned to
an individual patient in a home setting or a group of patients
within a hospital ward. Within the institutional care context,
for example, carebots can exhibit a limited form of justice
in the fair allocation of care to the care recipients. It may be
based on a few factors: the proper assignment of a carebot
to an approximately equal number of patients with similar
needs, a first-come-first-served rule to serve new patients,
and the possibility of re-allocation of assigned tasks in emer-
gency situations.
7.3 Close Associations Between Care Ethics andTrust
We have already discussed the close relationships between
trust and ethical design. Baier [5] specially underscored trust,
a basic relation between particular persons, as the fundamen-
tal concept of morality.
111 Swanton [69, p. 258].
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It is argued that adherence to Care Ethics promotes trust.
Held [34, p. 92] stated that “care is not the same thing as
trust, but caring relations should be characterized by trust,
and caring and trust sustain each other”.112 For her, trust
is important for care but it is not enough. There is still the
need to do the work of care. Tronto’s care ethics emphasised
the relationship between the caregiver and care recipient and
the latter’s needs. This focus on the relationship between the
parties advances mutual bonding and trust. Kittay [41, p. 248]
noted that when a person has to depend on another, he or she
also learns to trust.
Nissenbaum [52] related trust to security in the online
context; however, it is not a straightforward and linear rela-
tionship. For care robots, the safety aspects of the care robots
and the protection of the privacy of the patients and users
will enhance their physical and psychological security and
build trust. Nevertheless, it is merely one of the factors. Other
factors include the competence of carebots, the promotion of
wellbeing (beneficence) and the responsiveness of care recip-
ients towards the caregivers and the care provided.
In sum, trust as a normative concept is promoted when
care ethics is based on the competence of the carebots in an
assistive role to benefit care recipients, the proper allocation
of tasks and shared roles between the carebots, human care-
givers, designers and even the care recipients themselves as
well as the expectations engendered by care practices which
should be conducted in a responsible manner towards the
care recipients.
8 Conclusion
Carebots serve as a source of companionship and reminders
for patients, the elderly and children and are able to alleviate
the manual burdens and work of caregivers in taking care
of such patients and vulnerable persons. The use of carebots
encounters certain challenges as to the extent of care they are
capable of giving, the problem of deception arising from the
anthropomorphic form and appearance of robots, the concern
with overreliance and attachment to the carebots, and the
need to obtain informed consent and to show respect for the
privacy interests of patients and vulnerable persons.
Trust is needed in order to enable the adoption of carebots
in the healthcare context so that the benefits from the use
of carebots can be optimised and risks minimised. Trust and
ethical design are intertwined in the context of carebots in the
healthcare for vulnerable patients, children and the elderly.
Care Ethics as the central ethical framework is capa-
ble of dealing with the abovementioned challenges. It has
the potential to form the bedrock of an appropriate ethi-
cal framework for the design of carebots in the healthcare
112 Held [34, p. 42].
context. Ethical design and trust, though separate concepts,
are mutually reinforcing insofar as carebots are concerned.
Care Ethics is particularly relevant for vulnerable and depen-
dent persons such as patients, elderly, young children and
disabled. Tronto’s version of Care Ethics offers concrete
sub-principles based on the moral elements of attentiveness
to needs, responsibility, competence and responsiveness that
are applicable to carebots in the various caring contexts, and
are not inconsistent with certain aspects of the main ethical
theories (Utilitarianism, Deontology and Virtue Ethics). The
three facets of Principlism (namely non-maleficence, benefi-
cence and autonomy) and to a lesser extent, justice concerns,
can also be integrated into the care practices.
It is an on-going process to ensure proper fit between Care
Ethics in the design of carebots and public and user trust
according to the different contexts of use in the healthcare
sector. To promote the feasibility of the ethical design, the
interests and needs of multiple stakeholders namely the needs
and viewpoints of care recipients and their family members
and the impact on human caregivers and healthcare profes-
sionals should also be taken into consideration at the design
stage.
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